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K(EYNOTE
THE ROBERTS COURT
AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Gene R. Nicholt
I am honored to be here. Just off a stint as a university president,
I may be the only person in America who actually misses talking
to lawyers. And I'm glad to be here at Case Western-to be
re-introduced to old friends, and new. That includes, for me, your
former dean, Gary Simson, who was my teacher.
Dean Simson is largely responsible for my becoming an academic.
I wrote a paper for one of his classes that he convinced me to have
published. I certainly never would have done that on my own. And
since I was too bull-headed to do law review-not as thoughtful as
the marvelous group of students who have put together these
discussions-if I hadn't published that article, I would never have
been able to get a job as an academic. The University of Texas wasn't
exactly a "feeder" school.
There has been a time or two in the last couple of years when I
thought about Gary getting me into the academy, and I've been fairly
bitter about it. But I've always had great affection for Dean Simson.
When I was sitting in his equal protection class in 1976, I was a
football player from Oklahoma State University, with hair down his
back, who, on most days, dressed only in overalls. It is horrifying to
contemplate.
tProfessor of Law and Director, Center on Poverty, Work and Opportunity, University
of North Carolina. A version of this essay was given as the keynote address of the Case Western
Reserve Law Review's symposium, "Access to the Courts in the Roberts Era."
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I am also glad to come to Cleveland. Anybody who still believes
that "Major League" is the greatest American film, and Randy
Newman's "Burn On" is the closest we've come to true classical
music, has to look forward to coming to Cleveland. I also clerked for
Squire Sanders & Dempsey after my second year of law school. I
lived, for the summer, in a non-air conditioned third floor walk-up in
East Cleveland. It was there that I learned that Ohio is actually much
hotter than Texas in the summer. About that same time, the Supreme
Court decided my favorite case, Moore v. East Cleveland.' I had
always understood why Mrs. Moore wanted to be able to live in the
same house with her two grandkids. After that summer, I just never
knew why she wanted to do it in East Cleveland.
I do have a topic, you'll be relieved to hear: "The Roberts Court
and Access to Justice." Not simple. Not narrow. Not uniform. Not, I
think, single-minded. Not unimportant. Not good, I started to say. But
I'll hold off on that for a bit.
Thinking about access-for this Court and for its predecessors-
necessarily includes much. It surely implicates a bevy of issues even
well beyond the long list we are discussing today. It explores, of
course, the traditional tools of access-standing,2 mootness, ripeness,
political question,3 the congressional bestowal and stripping of
jurisdiction,4 the expansion of the Eleventh Amnendment 5 and other
6immunities, the continued dwindling of the writ of habeas corpus
(both statutorily and through judicial crankiness), and the increased
reluctance to entertain facial7 or vagueness challenges8 to statutory
regimes.
But it moves, as well, far beyond concepts of jurisdiction to
broadened standards of federal preemption,9 to tightened statutes (or
1431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating application of zoning law as violation of the right to
pri vacy).
2 See Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2007); Hemn v. Freedom from Religion Found.,
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006); Sprint
Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
3See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (political
question doctrine).
4See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (enforcement of the habeas corpus
suspension clause).
5See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
6 See, for example, this spring's decision in Van De Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855
(2009), outlining prosecutorial immunities.
7See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008); United States v.
Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008); Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008); Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124 (2007); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
8See Williamns, 128 S. Ct. 1830 (vagueness challenge to child pornography statute).
9See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008); Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp.
Ass'n, 128 S. Ct. 989 (2008); Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008);
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notions) of limitation,' 0 to new restrictions on the availability of
punitive damages' '--decisions which have led many, including, the
Kiplinger Business Report, 12the Wall Street Journal, and Erwin
Chemerin sky,'13 three brothers in the bond, to tag the Court as
decidedly pro-business. 1
A portrait of effective access would also turn to narrowed doors
for implied statutory causes of action'15 and to similar sentiments in
Bivens' 6 claims-arguing that "'Bivens is a relic of the heady days in
which [the] Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of
action."",7 A relic, the argument goes, that should be interred. And I
have at least one friend, a trier of civil rights cases, who claims that
the most worrisome limitation on judicial access of the past two
decades is the dramatically altered availability of summary judgment
in section 1983 cases-with its resulting foreclosure of rights to jury
trial. 18
Nor can the just-beginning-to-unfold legacy of the Roberts Court
and access to the judiciary be illustrated only by door-closing
ventures. Though the newest appointees have usually dissented, the
high Court's recent detainee decisions break remarkable ground in the
assurance of a federal judicial forum.' 9 Boumediene v. Bush 20 is a
surprising and, by my lights, courageous decision for this or any other
Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
10 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by
statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
1See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008); Philip Momrs USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
12 Jonathan Crawford, Bush's Lasting Legacy: A Pro-Business Judiciary, Mar. 10, 2008,
http://www.kiplinger.com/businessresource/forecast/archive/Bush-Leaves-aj.asting-Legacy-.
0803 10.hitmrl.
13 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947
(2008), quoted in Jonathan H. Adler, Getting the Roberts Court Right: A Response to
Chemerinsky, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 983 (2008).
14 See Jess Bravin, Court Under Roberts Limits Judicial Power, WALL ST. J., July 2,
2007, at Al1; see also Robert Barnes & Carrie Johnson, Pro-Business Decision Hews to Pattern
of Roberts Court, WASH. POST, June 22, 2007, at Dl1.
'5 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). But
see Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).
16 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
'7 Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 2608 (2007) (Thomas, J., & Scalia, J., concurring)
(quoting Correctional Sen's. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., concurring)); see also Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831 (2008)
(restricting claims under federal tort claims act).
18 See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
'9 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Harrdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
20 128 S. Ct. 2229.
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tribunal. Not only did the Court invalidate a statute under the habeas
corpus clause, rule against two branches of government acting in
concert under claims of national security, and prevent an explicit and
unequivocal effort to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts, but,
it has been argued, it offered "the most aggressive exercise of judicial
review of wartime measures adopted by the political branches in our
nation's history.",2 1 Boumediene is neither timid nor exclusionary.
And few modemn constitutional law decisions open the courthouse
doors more generously and more enthusiastically than District Of
Columbia v. Heller, 22 last summer's handgun case. Until then, as
Justice Stevens indicated, it had been understood that legislatures
could "regulate the civilian use . .. of firearms so long as they [did]
not interfere with the preservation" of, as the term goes, "a well-
regulated militia.",2 3 The Roberts majority decidedly "upset[] that
settled understanding" while leaving to "future cases the formridable
task of defining the scope of permissible regulations."2
The Heller opinion speaks in sweeping terms, reminding that any
"balancing" of interests required had already been accomplished, in
1791, by the people. Alan Morrison may be right that, under Heller,
we're in for a "round of [lawyers'] full employment"-though I'm
guessing it's not listed as part of the federal stimulus package .25 But
26
reportedly the National Rifle Association has already launched. And
the Justices are seemingly unconcerned about their stunning absence
of expertise to venture so boldly into such an arena.
So it is possible to see the Roberts Court's commitment to judicial
access from different and varied vantage points, and as reflecting
differing levels of consistency and commitment. I suppose it is not
surprising, speaking broadly though, that scholars like Kathleen
Sullivan would declare: "'[w]hat we actually have is a pretty bold
conservative agenda but it's clothed in the gentle language of
traditional modesty and restraint.,, 27 Or that the Wall Street Journal
would enthuse that "the biggest change under Chief Justice John
21 Adler, supra note 13, at 986.
22 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
23 Id. at 2846 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24 Id.
25 See Marcia Coyle, Man in the Middle: Justice Kennedy Continues His Role as a Pivotal
Vote on a Divided Court, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 6, 2008, at I (quoting Alan Morrison on Heller).
26 See Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009)
(challenging city handgun regulation), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S. L. WK. 3679 (June 3,
2009) (No. 08-1497); Nordyke v King, 563 F.3d 439 (9th Cir.) (challenging county gun
regulation), reh g en banc granted, 575 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2009).
27 Nina Totenberg, The Roberts Court and the Role of Precedent (National Public Radio
broadcast July 3, 2007) (quoting Kathleen Sullivan, director of the Stanford Law Constitutional
Law Center), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?stold=1 1688820.
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Roberts might not involve who wins on the merits. Rather, it may be
who gets through the courthouse door in the first place.,2
Like the Burger and Rehnquist Courts before it, the Roberts
tribunal seems to show greater zest for limiting the forms, remedies,
and processes of constitutional adjudication than in reversing the bold
strokes of its predecessors on the merits.29 This is, after all, mere
lawyers' work; hardly the stuff of major headlines and pointed
political campaigns-though Lilly Ledbetter proved the exception to
that generally-accurate rule.3
But the predilection for process is why, to wildly over-generalize,
constitutional law casebooks seem like something of a mish-mash of
stutter-steps expanding and contracting constitutional accountability;
while federal courts books deliver more of a forced march, across an
array of fronts, with decisions pointedly opening the federal forum in
the '60s and early '70s, followed by a current of cases later in the '70s
and then again in the '80s and '90s, and now taking away what
seemed to have been given.
I add only two brief points before turning, as requested, to the
underappreciated wonders of the case or controversy requirement.
The first is that, as we explore, throughout the day, the multiple
dimensions of the Roberts Court's treatment of access, it might be
well to remind of what we invariably leave out. Any discussion of
access to our judicial system with a thoughtful visitor from a distant
culture and clime would surely begin with our strongest transgression
against access and equality-the exclusion from the voluntary use of
the civil justice system of that huge proportion of the populace who
cannot afford to pay the fare. Not to put too fine a point on it, but we
carve "equal justice under law" on our courthouse walls. For decades,
we have announced as a fundamental principle of our constitutive law
that "[tihere can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has."3 Yet study after study
shows that at least 80 percent of the legal need of the poor in this
country is unmet.32 And the circumstance is almost as bleak for
middle-income Americans. What passes for civil justice among the
have-nots is astonishing. It cannot be counted, actually, as a system of
28 Bravin, supra note 14.
29 See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., An Activism of Ambivalence, 98 HARV. L. REV. 315 (1984)
(book review).
30 Ms. Ledbetter's case became part of the 2008 presidential campaign and resulted
in statutory changes bearing her name. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-2, 123 Stat. 5, superseding Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
3' Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding that a state must provide a trial
transcript to an indigent criminal defendant contesting his conviction).
32 See Gene Nichol, The Charge of Equal Justice, JUDGES' J., Summer 2008, at 38, 38-41.
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justice. Yet the inequity does not provoke the attention of the Court
that sits atop its structures.3 Nor, too frequently, does it make it to the
core of curricula and research in the legal academy we love. For that,
it is hard to find anything like an adequate excuse.
Second, having just returned from a cold twentieth of January trip
to the nation's capital, one of the most important things to be said
about access to justice and a Roberts Court-apart from my
prediction that our ever-confident Chief Justice will use a cheat-sheet
in 2013, or else turn the duties over to Justice Stevens, who will, by
then, be approximately 109-may well be that there won't really be
one. That is, there won't be a "Roberts Court."
The high Court of the next decade may well bear the Chief
Justice's name, but it will be a good deal less likely to profoundly
bear the marks of his predilections. An Obama presidency, whatever
else it might do, will not add to a Roberts, Alito, Scalia, Thomas
ascendancy. I'm not sure it's fair to characterize this Court as "'.the
most conservative Court since the m-id-1930s"' with Chemerinsky,3
or an "'unbreakable phalanx' of conservative justices" with
Dworkin,3 or the Court "conservatives had long yearned for and that
36liberals feared" with Linda Greenhouse, or the "Return of the Four
Horsemen" with Jonathan Turley,3 or even to say, as Justice Breyer
did a year and a half ago, "'[ilt is not often in law that so few have so
quickly changed so much."',3 8
Nor am I certain, as has been often asserted, that a studied agenda,
traceable to earlier stints in the Meese Justice Department, drives
Roberts Court decision-making. That agenda has been described as
"largely unchanged" in the decades since: "Expand executive power.
End racial preferences . . .. Speed executions. Welcome religion into
the public sphere. And, above all, reverse Roe v. Wade."3 It includes,
33 Though some members of the Court have seen fit to disparage the very question. See
Brown v. Legal Found, of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 252 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deriding
"Robin Hood Taking"-the "taking from the rich to give to indigent defendants").
34 See Adler, supra note 13, 985 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age
Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947, at 962 (2008)).
35 Id. at 984 (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, THE SUPREME COURT PHALANx: THE COURT'S
NEW RIG3HT-WING BLOC 47 (2008)).
36 Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 2007, at Al; see also Bravin, supra note 14 ("a score of decisions conservatives have
long yearned for").
37 See Jonathan Turley, The Roberts Court and the Return of the Four Horsemen
http://jonathanturley.org/2008/07/02/the-roberts-court-and-the-retum-of-the-four-horsemen/
(July 2, 2008).
38 Greenhouse, supra note 36.
39 Jeffrey Toobin, Five to Four, NEW YORKER, June 25, 2007, at 35; see also Ctr.
for Am. Progress, The Roberts Four: Men on a Mission, Oct. 1, 2007,
www.ameficanprogress.org/issues/2007/10/robents-court.html.
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as well, guidelines advocating tightened standing principles, even
when jurisdiction is bestowed by the United States Congress.4
If these verdicts are overstated, a recent empirical study of
Supreme Court decisions from 1986 to 2004 by professors Lindquist,
Smith and Cross finding that judicial "restraint [has been] contingent
on the source of the law at issue" is likely not .4 1 Two decades of
cases, they conclude, demonstrate not 'judicial restraint" but
"1commitment to a particular understanding of the Constitution .. . in
which both states and the executive branch [but not the Congress]
,,42
enjoy relatively great autonomy from legal restrictions. These
studies measure, of course, the work of the Roberts Court's
predecessor. But few would doubt that the present configuration of
conservative judges, if bolstered by new additions, would seek to take
us at least this far. If it is true, as many have claimed, that we now
have a Kennedy Court rather than a Roberts one;43 that, as it's said,
"'Roberts presides but Kennedy pivots,"'"4 the high Court of the next
ten years will likely reveal no dominant and overarching Roberts
imprint. I would be less than candid to deny my relief that this is so.
But enough of prognostication. As Mr. Berra famously noted, "It's
tough to make predictions, especially about the future."4 ' And if the
past calendar year has taught us anything, it is that we actually have
no idea what's about to come down the pipe. If we did, I assume that
everyone in this room would have made a fortune last year selling the
market short.
And what of the present Court's treatment of the mainstays of the
Article mI case or controversy requirement-the demand for concrete,
distinct, and palpable harm caused by the defendant and likely to be
redressed by favorable determination ? 46 Well here, surely, the Roberts
Court's rulings are not radical and studied efforts at door closing.
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation47 to My surprise, didn't
overturn Flast v. Cohen48 -ven if it treated it rudely. There Justice
Alito said, simply put, we've been idiotic on this front for forty years
40 See Lily Henning, Roberts and Scalia: Standing Side by Side, LEGAL TiMES, Aug. 1,
2005, at 8.
41 Stefanie A. Lindquist, Joseph L. Smith & Frank B. Cross, The Rhetoric of Restraint and
the Ideology of Activism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 103, 105 (2007).
42 Id. at 125.
43 See Totenberg, supra note 27; see also Linda Greenhouse, On Court That Defied
Labeling, Kennedy Made the Boldest Mark, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2007, at 1.
44 Totenberg, supra note 27 (quoting Yale Law Professor Akhil Amar).
45 See WorkingHumor.com, Humorous Quotes of Yogi Berra,
http://www.workinghumor.com/quotes/yogijberra.shtml (last visited Dec. 13, 2009).
46 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
47 127 U.S. 2553 (2007).
4392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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and idiotic we'll remain.4 It was a little like your teenage daughter
indicating "you're no stupider, dad, than you've always been."
In at least two decisions the Court has oddly welcomed suits
brought by states that would, we assume, otherwise be cast out as
exercises in general whining.5 Massachusetts v. EPA held, easily,
that the extraordinarily widespread nature of harm from global
warming "presents [no] insuperable jurisdictional obstacle" and that
"4a litigant to whom Congress has 'accorded a procedural right"' of
intervention "'can assert that right without meeting all the normal
standards for redressability and immediacy."' 5 ' Proving, once again,
that the Justices, a case or two notwithstanding,5 will treat
environmental disputes more generously than any other line of federal
cases-except perhaps actions brought to challenge the use of race in
drawing electoral districts. No wonder Justices Roberts and Scalia
sounded furious.
Rather than weighing the pros and cons of these forays-and the
shifting and transient majorities that produced them, I want, in my
final pages, to return to fundamentals. To the validity, the sensibility,
the comprehensibility, and, I suppose, the legitimacy, of the Court's
implementation of a bolstered and constitutionally-rooted injury
requirement. As you might have guessed, I'm not as big a fan as
some. And, as I was thinking about how to get at that-to draw out
the point-it occurred to me that I have one means that belongs,
perhaps, to none other.
You never know what will happen in this life. About fifteen years
ago I did another lecture, not unlike this one, at a distinguished law
school, set up by a noted law review, dealing with federal standing
questions and followed by a learned panel of commentators
explaining, as is traditional, that I didn't know what I was talking
about-all subsequently published in an accomplished journal.5
With no offense to anyone, and apologies for my own poor
memory, suffice to say that until three or four years ago, I had
forgotten the entire transaction. That is, until John Roberts got
nominated to be Chief Justice and my phone started ringing
incessantly. The soon-to-be-chief had apparently been one of the
49 He in, 127 S.Ct. 2553.
50 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2007)
(distinguishing Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932)).
51 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517-18 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 572 n.7 (1992)). See also the assignee standing decision in Sprint Commnc'ns Co. v. APCC
Sen's., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531 (2008).
52 See Lujan, 504 U.S. 554.
53 See-Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DuKE
L.J. 1141 (1993).
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commentators and his article-or as he referred to it in his hearings-
his "little comment"-was one of the few published records of his
legal thought .5 So it was briefly explored much more widely than a
law review article has any inherent right to expect.
Apparently all that could be conclusively proved before Roberts
took the highest legal seat on the planet was that he didn't think much
of my jurisdictional theories. When all this transpired, I was a new
public university president who was already engaged in a political
struggle or two. Struggles, for any aficionados among you, upon
which I ultimately did not prevail. So I repeatedly said to the press
only something that was undoubtedly true: "If John Roberts was
critical on my standing theories that lands him soundly and irrefutably
in the legal and academic mainstream.",5
1 mention all this to focus on Roberts's conclusion, as an advocate
for a tightened case or controversy requirement, even in the face of
congressional acts to the contrary:
"Standingli's injury requirement]," Roberts wrote, "is an apolitical
limitation on judicial power. It restricts the right of conservative
public interest groups to challenge liberal agency action or inaction,
just as it restricts the right of liberal public interest groups to
challenge conservative agency action or inaction. . . . [The
assumption that it cloaks a political agenda is] facile.,5
This enthusiasm for a vigorously implemented injury standard is
apparent as well in Roberts's forceful opinions in DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno,5  Massachusetts v. EPA, 8 and Sprint Communications
Co. v. APCC Services, Inc.5 I'll conclude by expressing, perhaps
unsurprisingly, my modest disagreement.
I don't mean just that the Court's use of injury is often
non-neutral in the crassest political sense-like when judges, liberal
and conservative, simply switch positions, abandoning their
traditional colors to suit the day. Like a jockey deciding to ride
temporarily for another owner. Or Brett Favre donning a Jets uniform.
As in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow 6 0-the pledge of
54 See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219
(1993); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 342 (2005)
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) (referring to "that small little Law Review comment").
55 See generally Lily Henning, D.C. Circuit Shows Its Right Stripes, LEGAL TIMES, Aug.
8, 2005, at 1 (describing the D.C. Circuit at the time of Roberts's rise to the Supreme Court as
conservative, but not overly ideological).
56 Roberts, supra note 54, at 1230.
57 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
58 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
59 128 S. Ct. 2531 (2008).
- 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
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allegiance case-where Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Thomas
argued for novel door-opening theories and Justice Stevens's majority
opinion (for the liberals) employed an entirely new theory of
prudential restraint. Or the similar flop that occurred in Gratz v.
61 62Bollinger.6  Or in Shaw v. Reno. 2Or when we see Justice Scalia
advocate the broadest possible reading of the zone of interest test-
and then enthuse, in Bennett v. Spear, 63 over "enforcement by
so-called 'private attorneys general"' of environmental claims in
which all have a common interest4-leading my federal courts
students to wonder whether the book contained a misprint. That is,
until they read the facts more fully. This sort of manipulation is
simply the Bush v. Gore 65 shuffle. Any legal standard, with even the
tiniest imprecision, is subject to its variations. And, two hundred
years into the venture, to understate, we have not been able to render
the definition of a case or controversy precise.
Nor has the injury standard managed to avoid repeated
applications that employ controverted, non-neutral and unexplained
visions of the reach, status, and enforceability of constitutional
provisions. Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 66 for example,
appears as a simple case to most members of the Court. There, voters
opposed to policies advocated by American Israel Public Affairs
Committee challenged the Federal Election Commission's refusal to
require disclosure of its membership and contribution records under
the Federal Election Campaign Act.6 Even when "large numbers of
Americans suffer alike,"6 the Court wrote, their "inability to obtain
information" that must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute
constitutes an "injury in fact. ,6
Of course, United States v. Richardson 70 has, for decades, stood
testament to the fact that an analogous provision of the Constitution-
the Accounts Clause-provides no such legally cognizable interest.
61 539 U.S. 244 (2003). Justices Stevens and Souter pointed out standing difficulties, idL at
282-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 291-92 (Souter, J., dissenting), which were rejected by
Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 260-68 (majority opinion).
62 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
63 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
64 Id. at 165.
65 531 U.S. 98 (2000). The conservatives on the court took the position that a recount
would violate Bush's equal protection ights, despite their normal skepticism of such claims.
- 524 U.S. 11I(1998).
67 Id. at 15-16.
68 Id. at 23.
69 Id. at 21. Justice Scalia argued in dissent that the plaintiffs in Akins had no more right to
the requested information than did any other American. Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., disscntinig). As a
result, Justice Scalia insisted that the case should have been barred by the Court's generalized
grievance decisions. Id. at 35.
70 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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Leaving the odd result, though an odd result we've long become
accustomed to, that if a widely shared interest is seen as so
compelling that it is written into the text of the Constitution, it
provides less litigating "oomph" than a similarly generalized statutory
interest or even an apparently commonly accepted social value (like
an interest in the plight of the snail-darter7t ).
Hein can be seen in this way as well.7 The case has its
complications: the unexplainable distinction between executive and
legislative expenditures, the embrace of the open laundering of funds
to avoid the strictures of the First Amendment, the beyond-wooden
reading of the Court's jurisdictional rules, the fact that three distinct
groups of Justices can call one another disparaging names and all be
correct.
But the Court's "individual injury only" reading of the
Establishment Clause is hard to square, as Chip Lupu and Robert
Tuttle have argued, with the limited government, restricted-sphere,
bounded separationist designs of the First Amendment .7  Or with
what even Chief Justice Roberts has ruled the Madisonian right "not
to "'contribute three pence. ... for the support of any one [religious]
establishment.""'. 7 4 It is unsurprising, perhaps, that the full panel of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals would, last year, read Hein as
blocking standing in an action challenging prayers conducted at a
local school board meeting. 75 Concur-ring, Judge DeMoss wrote that
mere exposure to government-sponsored prayer inflicts no greater
injury on the observer than does a taxpayer's forced contribution.7
Injury may be swell. But with so little textual grounding, and so
much mystery in definition, it is difficult to see why it should delimit
or trump various constitutional interests of far clearer pedigree.
But the toughest medicine of the injury requirement is not its
theoretical justification, but its practical implementation. I wouldn't,
perhaps, agree with every word of Justice Scalia's zesty opinion in
Hein. But he is surely right, in fleshing out his proffered distinction
between "Wallet" injuries and "Psychic" ones, to say:
7' Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
72 See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2553 (2007).
73 IMa C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Cross at College: Accommodation and
Acknowledgement of Religion at Public Universities, 16 Wm. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 939, 96M-2
(2008); see also Douglas W. Kmiec, Standing Still-Did the Roberts Court Narrow, but Not
Overrule, Flast to Allow Time to Re-Think Establishment Clause Jurisprudence?, 35 PEPP. L.
REV. 509 (2008).
74 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 347 (2006) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 103 (1968)) (distinguishing a state taxpayer standing case from Flast and Hein).
75 See Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
76 See id. at 499-50 1 (DeMoss, J., concurring).
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The basic logical flaw in our cases is thus twofold: We have
never explained why Psychic Injury was insufficient in the
cases in which standing was denied, and we have never
explained why Psychic Injury, however limited, is cognizable
under Article flI[, in the cases in which standing was
granted].~
Well said.
Why, then, do plaintiffs challenging racially crafted districts need
prove no vote dilution, no diminished representational capacity, and
no hampered ability to aggregate votes with like-minded citizens? It
is enough, apparently, to assert that a constitutionally questionable
practice sends abroad an unfortunate message.7 This theory, though,
has been regularly rejected on less favored fronts.7
Why can plaintiffs attacking affirmative action programs escape
the usual obligation of showing that they actually lost something
concrete-like a contract, a job, or a seat in a medical school class-
as a consequence of the purportedly illegal practices? 80 They "need
not allege that [they] would have obtained the benefit but for the
barrier in order to establish standing.', 8' According to the Justices, the
"tension" resulting with traditional standing decisions like Warth v.
Seldin and Allen v. Wright is "minimal."8 This says, implicitly, that
the white challengers may not have suffered injury, but they've come
close. It constitutes standing law's special treatment program for
those challenging special treatment programs.
Compare these rulings with decisions like Lewis v. Casey.83 There
the Court held that a petitioner denied access to a prison library in
violation of Bounds v. Smith 84 asserts no concrete injury unless he can
demonstrate the materials would have yielded claims apt to overturn
his conviction. The opinion calls to mind certain images about carts
preceding horses. And I don't know what the parallel would be in an
77 Hein,127 S. Ct. at 2575 (Scalia, J., concurring).
78 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1045 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Gene R.
Nichol, Jr., Standing For Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REv. 301, 313-
16(2002).
79 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
10 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 282-91 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(comparing first year and transfer student admissions policies); Ne. Fla. Chapter of the
Associated General Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 659 (1993);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978) (Powell, J, concurring).
81 Ne. Fla. Chapter, 508 U.S. at 666 ('The 'injury in fact' is the inability to compete on an
equal footing in the bidding process, not the loss of a contract."); see also Parents Involved in
Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738 (200U7).
82 Ne. Fla. Chapter, 508 U.S. at 668.
83 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
- 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
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affirmative action admissions case. Perhaps the petitioner would have
to prove not only that he would actually get admitted to law school,
but pass the bar, and land a job?
The Article III cases attempt, first, to make the injury test operate
with a precision and solidity it likely cannot sustain. They then
compound the challenge by failing to offer comprehensible
justifications for the choices the Justices make. The bolstered
standing requirement becomes an opaque labeling exercise, often
employed as surrogate for larger currents-currents of federalism, or
separation of powers, or an unbounded urge to reach the case on the
merits, either to embrace its theories or to bury them.
A rule of concrete, palpable, rugged, redressable harm that
embraces an intensely subjective and yet non-personalized concern
over the racial aesthetics of voting district lines ,8  a shared
apprehension over congressional expenditures that aid religious
groups, 86an apparently individuated or representational interest in the
impacts of global warming, 87 the generalized "benefits of living in an
integrated community,, 88 personal annoyance over the structuring of
a government bidding process, even if one would never have
successfully obtained a bid'89  and the borrowed interest in
representing a class even after one's own dispute has been rendered
moot;90 is, perhaps, an odd one.9 1 T[hen, by comparison, a standard
that rejects summarily an action based on the palpable fear of a
second choking by the Los Angeles Police Department, 92  or
judicially-assumed instances of exclusionary zoning,93 or challenges
to religious spending by the executive branc94  and analogous
compliance claims under the Commerce Clause,9 5-the Elections
Clause,9 the Accounts Clause ,9  and the Incompatibility Claus
85 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
86 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
87 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
88 See Trafficante v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (action under the 1968
Civil Rights Act).
89 Adarand Contractors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Ne. Hla. Chapter of Associated
General Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
90 See U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
91 One could add Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316
(t999) (allowing challenge to statistical sampling in census on the possibility that it could affect
vote dilution).
92 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
93 warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
94 Hemn v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007); Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464
(1982).
95 DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
96 See Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2007).
9" United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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only compounds the mystery. This purported vision of durable harm
is interesting, curious, unexplained, and unexplainable. And, contrary
to Chief Justice Roberts's hopes, it is not neutral, an "apolitical
limitation on judicial power."99 The ability to pick and choose entry
points with such discretion aggrandizes judicial authority. It doesn't
diminish it.
It is also odd, of course, to attempt to enforce such a meandering
slalom on the United States Congress. One would think that a
well-earned modesty would bar the Justices from exporting their work
product to direct collisions with co-equal branches of government. 10
And the fluttering nature of injury surely makes discussions of
Article III originalism, at best, quaint. I remain one who believes,
with the historians,' 01 that the common law backdrop of the case or
controversy requirement allowed the presentation of actions without
demonstrable personal injury. But even if that's not so, the harm
suffered because my representational prowess is only 96 percent of
that of my colleagues in the district next door, I'm guessing, would be
well beyond anyone's notion of litigational triggering in 1789.
I close only by adding that there is, perhaps, one thing worse than
a legal standard so thin, so conclusory, that it can't do the work for
which it is advertised. And that is if it seems, in operation, to more
frequently aid the powerful and hinder the powerless. I know it's
possible to see the United States Supreme Court's standing decisions
of the past two and a half decades from many different lights. But
surely one of them is that what has been made demonstrably easier
for those who would challenge efforts to increase minority voting
representation, or minority access to higher education, or government
contracting has been made decidedly more difficult for those seeking
to attack government decisions that burden the economically
marginalized, or that support private racial discrimination, or that
limit the availability of essential social services, or contest brutal law
enforcement practices, or that challenge the preferences offered to
dominant religions.102
In a society still the richest on earth, the richest in human history-
but where one in five children lives in stark unrelenting poverty;
where we can boast, if that is the word, the largest gaps between rich
98 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
99 Roberts, supra note 54, at 1230.
100But see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
101 See Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969).
101 Nichol, supra note 78.
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and poor in the industrial world; where we spend more on health care
than any other nation, but leave dramatically more of our fellows
outside the system, in the shadows; where a huge cut of the populace
is flatly priced out of the voluntary use of the civil justice system;
where we have, yet, rich and poor public schools, not just private
ones; where access to higher education is so closely linked to family
income, 103 and where the political system itself is perennially skewed
toward the interests of the wealthy-I would be loathe to add yet one
more regime that, even if indirectly, favors the powerful and chides
the powerless. In the world's greatest democracy, we've got enough
of that already. 104
103 Gene Nichol, Educating for Privilege, THE NATION, Oct. 13, 2003, at 22.
104See Gene R. Nichol, Law's Disengaged Left, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 547 (2000).
20091 835

